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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 










MARTIN HORN, in his official capacity as the 
Commissioner of the Pennsylvania 
Department of Corrections; 
PHILIP JOHNSON, in his official capacity as 
Superintendent of the State Correctional 
Institution at Greene 
 
APPEAL FROM 
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 97-cv-01811) 
District Judge: The Honorable Gary L. Lancaster 
 
ARGUED FEBRUARY 3, 2000 
 
BEFORE: MANSMANN, NYGAARD and RENDELL, 
Circuit Judges. 
 




       Daniel M. Kovalik, Esq. (Argued) 
       Room 807 
       5 Gateway Center 
       Pittsburgh, PA 15222 
 
        Attorney for Appellant 
 
       John G. Knorr, III, Esq. (Argued) 
       J. Bart DeLone, Esq. 
       Office of Attorney General 
        of Pennsylvania 
       Department of Justice 
       Strawberry Square, 15th Floor 
       Harrisburg, PA 17120 
 
        Attorneys for Appellees 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellant Russell Shoats is currently imprisoned in the 
State Correctional Institution at Greene, Pennsylvania 
("SCI-Greene"), and brings this civil rights action pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. S 1983. He challenges his continued 
confinement in administrative custody, i.e., solitary 
confinement. Shoats claims that Appellees, the 
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and Philip 
Johnson, Superintendent of SCI-Greene, have kept him in 
administrative custody in violation of his Fourteenth 
Amendment right to procedural due process. He seeks 
immediate release into the general prison population, 
damages, and other relief. 
 
Although we hold that Shoats has a protected liberty 
interest in being released from administrative confinement, 
we conclude that SCI-Greene's procedures for evaluating 
whether Shoats should remain in administrative custody 
comported with procedural due process requirements. 
Accordingly, we will affirm. 
 
I. Factual Background 
 
In 1970, Shoats was convicted of first degree murder for 
his part in an attack on a Philadelphia police guardhouse. 
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Shoats participated in the attack as a member of a black 
revolutionary group that sought to eradicate all authority. 
One police officer was killed and another seriously wounded 
in the attack. Shoats was sentenced to life imprisonment. 
Seven years later, in September 1977, Shoats and several 
other inmates took over a cell block at the Huntingdon 
State Correctional Institution as part of an attempt to 
escape. Shoats injured several guards with a knife, and, 
along with three other prisoners, attempted to escape from 
the prison as planned. Two of the inmates were captured 
immediately and a third was killed during the escape. 
Shoats remained at large until he was captured in October 
1977. 
 
While Shoats was a fugitive, he entered the home of a 
prison guard and forced him, his wife, and theirfive year 
old son to drive him in their car to a location outside 
Cokesburg, Pennsylvania. Shoats then ordered the hostages 
to enter the woods where he left them tied to a tree for 
almost four hours. Shoats was captured, and convicted of 
escape, robbery, kidnaping and simple assault. He was 
later transferred to Fairview State Hospital for the 
criminally insane. In March 1979, Shoats had guns 
smuggled in to him and escaped from that maximum 
security institution, again taking a hostage. In addition to 
escape and taking hostages, Shoats also has a history of 
threatening and assaulting his fellow inmates, and of 
causing disruptions at the institutions in which he is 
incarcerated. 
 
Pennsylvania correctional institutions have two basic 
types of housing, general population and restricted 
housing. An inmate in general population may be permitted 
to be outside of his cell for lengthy periods throughout the 
day. General population inmates are permitted to have 
contact visits at least one day per week, and may 
participate in educational and vocation programs, approved 
inmate organizations, and approved fund-raising projects. 
 
Inmates in disciplinary and administrative custody are 
confined in Restricted Housing Units (RHU). They are 
housed in disciplinary custody when, following a hearing, 
they have been found guilty of prison misconduct. The 
maximum period that an inmate may be confined in 
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disciplinary custody is ninety days. In contrast, 
administrative custody is used to assure a safe and secure 
environment for all inmates and staff by separating those 
inmates whose presence in the general population 
constitutes a threat to themselves, others, or the safety and 
security of the institution, or who represent an escape risk. 
Inmates in administrative custody are not allowed to have 
radios, televisions, telephone calls (except emergency or 
legal), personal property except writing materials, or books 
other than legal materials and a personal religious volume. 
Non-legal visits of one per week are allowed under 
appropriate security procedures designated by the Program 
Review Committee (PRC). Pennsylvania does not provide 
inmates in administrative custody with educational 
programs, and all meals are eaten in the inmates' cells. 
 
Unlike disciplinary custody, there is no maximum period 
of confinement in administrative custody. Rather, release 
depends upon an evaluation of many factors. While time 
spent and behavior are to be considered, so too are 
continued risk, safety of others, and recommendations of 
prison personnel, including treatment staff. 
 
Under Department of Corrections (DOC) policy, an inmate 
must receive written notice of the reason for his placement 
in administrative custody and he is entitled to receive a 
hearing before a PRC within six days of the initial transfer 
to administrative custody. Every thirty days thereafter, 
inmates assigned to administrative custody have the 
opportunity to be personally interviewed by the PRC, which 
then determines whether the inmate should continue to be 
maintained in administrative custody, taking into account 
a variety of factors including the safety of other inmates 
and staff, the continued public or institutional risk, and the 
recommendation of treatment staff. 
 
In addition to separation from the general prison 
population, the DOC may order that specific prisoners be 
separated from each other and, if necessary, placed in 
different institutions. The DOC may enter such orders after 
reviewing specific instances of misconduct, and determining 
that specific separation is appropriate. As a result of such 
review, Shoats currently has fifteen individuals from whom 
he must be separated. 
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As of 1989, Shoats was imprisoned at the State 
Correctional Institution in Dallas, Pennsylvania ("SCI- 
Dallas"), where he was placed in administrative custody. In 
November of that year he was transferred to the federal 
penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas. When he returned to 
Pennsylvania in June 1991, Shoats was again imprisoned 
at SCI-Dallas and again placed in administrative custody. 
In January 1995, he was transferred to SCI-Greene, where 
he continues to be held in administrative custody. 
 
Shoats has spent an extraordinarily long period in 
administrative custody. Nonetheless, his status has been 
subject to PRC review every thirty days. No member of a 
PRC has ever recommended releasing Shoats from 
administrative custody; they have universally concluded 
that Shoats remains a significant danger to institutional 
safety and security. These conclusions are supported by 
DOC psychological evaluations of Shoats, which 
characterize him as a remorseless sociopath knowledgeable 
in the workings of prisons and escape techniques, capable 
of leading other inmates in such undertakings, and inclined 
to do so. He has also been described as volatile and 
manipulative. 
 
In June 1998, the Secretary of the DOC asked Thomas 
James, a special assistant to the Secretary, to conduct an 
extensive review to determine whether Shoats should 
remain in administrative custody. James recognized that 
such extended administrative custody was atypical for the 
prison population. He noted that Shoats' volatile nature 
and need to be separated from numerous other prisoners 
make his situation unique. However, his review also 
concluded that, as with other inmates who have a history 
of escape and violence against correctional officers and 
other inmates, Shoats' continued placement in 
administrative custody is absolutely necessary. 
 
Thereafter, Shoats brought this action pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. S 1983, seeking to be immediately released into the 
general prison population. He also sought damages and 
other relief. He claims that the appellees, the Secretary of 
the DOC and the Superintendent of SCI-Greene, have kept 
him in administrative custody in violation of his Fourteenth 
Amendment right to procedural due process. 
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Following discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment. The District Court agreed with Shoats 
that he possesses a protected liberty interest in obtaining 
release into the general population. However, adopting the 
recommendation of the magistrate judge, the District Court 
held that the defendants had provided Shoats with the 
process he was due and granted the defendants' motion for 




Shoats claims that the duration of his placement in 
solitary confinement, and the attendant hardships of such 
confinement, require that we affirm the District Court's 
conclusion that he possesses a protected liberty interest in 
being released to the general prison population. He also 
claims that Defendants did not afford him all of the process 
he was due. The record evidence leads us to conclude that 
although Shoats' confinement is sufficient to trigger the 
procedural protections of the Due Process Clause, the 
process provided him was sufficient to pass Constitutional 
muster. 
 
A. Shoats' Liberty Interest 
 
In analyzing a procedural due process claim, thefirst 
step is to determine whether the nature of the interest is 
one within the contemplation of the `liberty or property' 
language of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Fuentes v. 
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Once we determine that the 
interest asserted is protected by the Due Process Clause, 
the question then becomes what process is due to protect 
it. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 
 
Protected liberty or property interests generally arise 
either from the Due Process Clause or from state-created 
statutory entitlement. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 
U.S. 564, 575 (1972). In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 
(1995), the Supreme Court announced a new standard for 
determining whether prison conditions deprive a prisoner of 
a liberty interest that is protected by procedural due 
process guarantees. Although the Court acknowledged that 
liberty interests could arise from means other than the Due 
Process Clause itself, the Court concluded that state- 
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created liberty interests could arise only when a prison's 
action imposed an "atypical and significant hardship on the 
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." 
515 U.S. at 483. 
 
At issue in Sandin was whether the plaintiff's thirty-day 
detention in disciplinary custody in a Hawaii prison 
impacted any protected liberty interest under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court concluded that the 
prisoner in Sandin did not have a protected liberty interest 
in remaining free of disciplinary detention or segregation 
because his thirty-day detention, although punitive,"did 
not exceed similar, but totally discretionary confinement in 
either duration or degree of restriction." Id. at 486. In 
finding that the prisoner's thirty-day confinement in 
disciplinary custody did not present the type of atypical, 
significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably 
create a liberty interest, the Court considered the following 
two factors: 1) the amount of time the prisoner was placed 
into disciplinary segregation; and 2) whether the conditions 
of his confinement in disciplinary segregation were 
significantly more restrictive than those imposed upon 
other inmates in solitary confinement. Id. 
 
The parties in this case do not dispute the fact that very 
few Pennsylvania prisoners have been confined in 
administrative custody for periods of eight years or more. 
Ben Varner, the Superintendent who reviewed the PRC 
decisions on Shoats, testified that to the best of his 
recollection, approximately one percent of the inmate 
population at SCI-Greene has been confined in restricted 
housing for such lengthy periods of time. (Varner Dep. at 
54-61; A145-52). Moreover, Thomas James, Special 
Assistant to DOC Commissioner Martin Horn, concedes 
that the amount of time Shoats has already spent in 
administrative confinement is not only atypical, but is 
indeed "unique." A214-15. 
 
In addition, the record suggests that Shoats' long-term 
confinement has imposed a significant hardship on him in 
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Shoats has 
been confined in virtual isolation for almost eight years. See 
A45 (Shoats Dep.). He is confined in his cell for 23 hours a 
day, five days a week, and 24 hours a day, two days a 
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week. Id. He eats meals by himself. Id.  His sole contact is 
with DOC officials, and has been denied contact with his 
family for almost eight years. Id. He is prohibited from 
participating in any educational, vocational, or other 
organizational activities. Id. He is prohibited from visiting 
the library. Id. James concedes that he has never witnessed 
one example of such permanent solitary confinement in his 
22 years with the DOC. See A211. Moreover, James 
explained that he would be concerned about the 
psychological damage to an inmate after only 90 days of 
such confinement and would generally recommend transfer 
to the general population after 90 days as a consequence. 
See A184-85, 188-90. 
 
Based on this record, we have no difficulty concluding 
that eight years in administrative custody, with no prospect 
of immediate release in the near future, is "atypical" in 
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life, and that 
Shoats' eight-year confinement subjects him to conditions 
that differ significantly from "routine" prison conditions in 
Pennsylvania state institutions. 
 
B. Shoats' Due Process Claim 
 
Although we hold that Shoats has a protected liberty 
interest that has been adversely affected by his indefinite 
segregation in administrative custody, we reject Shoats' 
argument that he has been deprived of the process he is 
due under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
In Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983), the Supreme 
Court considered whether prison inmates were entitled to 
due process before being placed in solitary confinement for 
administrative -- rather than disciplinary -- reasons. The 
Court expressly rejected the idea that due process required 
a "detailed adversary proceeding," on the ground that it 
would not "materially assist" the decision to be made. Id. at 
473-74. The Court further held that in these situations, an 
"informal, nonadversary review" at which the prisoner has 
the opportunity to state his views, satisfies the 
requirements of due process: 
 
       An inmate must merely receive some notice of the 
       charges against him and an opportunity to present his 
       views to the prison official charged with deciding 
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       whether to transfer him to administrative segregation. 
       Ordinarily a written statement by the inmate will 
       accomplish this purpose, although prison 
       administrators may find it more useful to permit oral 
       presentations in cases where they believe a written 
       statement would be ineffective. So long as this occurs, 
       and the decisionmaker reviews the charges and then- 
       available evidence against the prisoner, the Due 
       Process Clause is satisfied. 
 
Id. at 476. 
 
The inmate in Hewitt received notice of the charges 
against him the day after his misconduct took place. Id. at 
477. Only five days after his transfer to administrative 
segregation, a Hearing Committee reviewed the existing 
evidence against him. Id. Moreover, the inmate 
acknowledged on his misconduct form that he "had the 
opportunity to have [his] version reported as part of the 
record," and thus had an opportunity to present a 
statement to the Committee. Id. The Supreme Court held 
that this proceeding plainly satisfied the Due Process 
requirements for confinement of the inmate in 
administrative custody. Id. Here, Shoats has been given 
exactly the same opportunities as those given to the inmate 
in Hewitt; there is therefore no question that, on its face, 
the procedure provided to Shoats is constitutionally 
adequate. 
 
The process provided by the Pennsylvania DOC to an 
inmate confined in administrative custody is as follows. A 
hearing is conducted by the PRC, in which the rationale for 
the administrative custody placement is read and explained 
to the inmate. See A84. The inmate is permitted to respond 
to the rationale for administrative custody placement either 
orally or in writing. Id. A Committee member then drafts a 
summary of the inmate's statements. Id. A written 
summary of the entire hearing is then prepared, which 
includes the reasons relied upon by the PRC to reach its 
decision, and a copy of this summary is given to the 
inmate. Id. 
 
An inmate may appeal the PRC's decision to the 
Superintendent in writing within two days of the completion 
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of the hearing, and the decision of the Superintendent must 
be forwarded to the inmate within ten days of the receipt of 
the appeal. See A85. The inmate's right to appeal 
terminates when he or she is released from administrative 
custody. Id. 
 
At least once every thirty days, those inmates assigned to 
administrative custody have the right to be personally 
interviewed by the PRC. Id. For those inmates not released 
from administrative custody following the thirty-day review, 
the reasons for the PRC's decision are forwarded to the 
Superintendent for his or her review. Id. If the 
Superintendent agrees that the rationale for holding an 
inmate in administrative custody is reasonable, he or she 
notifies the inmate accordingly. Id. If, however, the 
Superintendent believes the inmate should be released to 
the general population, he or she will so order it. Id. 
 
After an inmate is confined for ninety days in 
administrative custody, the Superintendent must complete 
a formal report to the Regional Deputy Commissioner, who 
then reviews the recommendation of the institution to 
determine if any further action is necessary. Id. Further 
action may include release to the general population, 
transfer to another facility or program, or continuation in 
administrative custody. Id. In light of the standard set forth 
by the Supreme Court in Hewitt, we conclude that the 
Pennsylvania procedures clearly comply with due process 
requirements. 
 
The record reflects that the procedures called for did in 
fact occur. Specific program review committee progress 
reports are included in the record, which reflect Shoats' 
choice to appear at some, but not all, of his PRC reviews. 
The reports reflect that Shoats raised and discussed 
various issues at these committee sessions, including his 
desire for library time, complaints about the commissary 
and medical treatment, visitation rights, and other general 
matters. In many instances, Shoats complained about the 
denial of his release into the general population, and he 
was advised of the prison's reasons for denying his release. 
There is no indication that Shoats presented any 
countervailing arguments or considerations to the review 
committee. 
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Shoats does not argue that he was denied the 
opportunity to respond or be heard, nor does he argue that 
the prison authorities failed to consider favorable 
information or that they otherwise dealt with his case in a 
perfunctory fashion. Cf. Sourbeer v. Robinson , 791 F.2d 
1094, 1101 (3d Cir. 1986). In fact, Shoats does not contend 
that he made any arguments, or offered any favorable 
factual data to counter the prison's rationale for holding 
him. Rather, Shoats argues that his continued confinement 
in administrative custody is based solely on his past crimes 
of murder, escape, kidnaping and assault, and therefore 
has no contemporaneous justification. (Appellant's Br. at 
42-48). We disagree. Shoats is not confined to 
administrative custody simply because he committed 
crimes in the past, but because he is, in the considered 
judgment of all the prison professionals who have evaluated 
him, a current threat to the security and good order of the 
institution, and to the safety of other people. See A238-44 
(Mistrick Dep.). This assessment is based partly on Shoats' 
conduct, but also on the prison professionals' current 
impressions of him based on their day-to-day dealings with 
Shoats over time. See, e.g., A243 (Mistrick Dep.)("[H]e 
represents a danger to the secure running of the institution 
and the safety of others"); A115 (Varner Dep.)("[I]n my 
opinion, this man was still a danger"); A169 (White Dep.)("I 
felt he was still dangerous"). 
 
Even were we to conclude that Shoats' continued 
confinement in administrative custody is based solely on 
his past crimes, the process he received would nonetheless 
pass constitutional muster, because predictions of likely 
future behavior based on a generally volatile criminal 
character have been upheld by the Supreme Court: 
 
       In assessing the seriousness of a threat to institutional 
       security, prison administrators necessarily draw on 
       more than the specific facts surrounding a particular 
       incident; instead, they must consider the character of 
       the inmates confined in the institution, recent and 
       longstanding relations between prisoners and guards, 
       prisoners inter se, and the like. In the volatile 
       atmosphere of a prison, an inmate easily may 
       constitute an unacceptable threat to the safety of other 
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       prisoners and guards even if he himself has committed 
       no misconduct; rumor, reputation, and even more 
       imponderable factors may suffice to spark potentially 
       disastrous incidents. The judgment of prison officials in 
       this context, like that of those making parole decisions, 
       turns largely on purely subjective evaluations and on 
       predictions of future behavior. 
 
See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 474 (internal citations omitted). 
Thus, Shoats could conceivably be held in administrative 
custody merely because his prior crimes reasonably 
foreshadow future misconduct. 
 
Shoats also claims that his confinement is the result of 
the "bias" of Superintendent Varner, who reviewed his 
confinement at SCI-Greene, first as a member of the PRC 
and later as Superintendent. (Appellant's Br. at 38-39). 
However, Shoats' administrative custody dates back to 
1991, long before Shoats came to SCI-Greene, and it has 
continued to the present, long after Varner left SCI-Greene 
in April 1998. No member of the PRC, and no 
Superintendent, at SCI-Greene or elsewhere, has ever 
recommended that Shoats be released to the general prison 
population. Thus, we hold that Shoats' "bias" argument is 
without foundation. 
 
Shoats' confinement in administrative custody has been, 
in accordance with the DOC regulations, reviewed every 
month by the PRC and the Superintendent. Furthermore, 
Shoats has been given the opportunity to present his views 
personally at each review. See A85-86. In effect, the record 
demonstrates that Shoats' continued placement in 
administrative custody is supported by evidence sufficient 
to pass constitutional muster. Because Shoats has failed to 
provide any support for his assertions that his PRC reviews 
were constitutionally inadequate, we hold that the periodic 
reviews conducted by the PRC here comport with the 




Accordingly, we affirm the district court's decision. 
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